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 I.INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  argues  that  private  property  and  rights 
assignment,  especially  as  applied  to  communication 
infrastructure  and  information,  should  be  informed  by 
advances  in  both  technology  and  our  understanding  of 
psychology.   Current law in this area in the United States 
and  many  other  jurisdictions  is  founded  on  assumptions 
about human behavior that have been shown not to hold 
empirically.  A joint recognition of this fact, together with an 
understanding  of  what  new  technologies  make  possible, 
leads one to question basic assumptions about how law is 
made and what laws we should have in a given area, if any.  
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I  will  begin by analyzing different  aspects  of  U.S.  law, 
from a  high-level  critique  of  law  making  to  a  critique  of 
rights assignment for what I call “simple nonrival goods.”.  I 
will (a) describe my understanding, as a non-lawyer with a 
background  in  psychology  and  computing,  of  the  current 
conventions  in  U.S.  law,  (b)  consider  the  foundational 
assumptions  that  justify  current  conventions,  (c)  describe 
advances  in  psychology  and  technology  that  call  these 
conventions into question, and (d) briefly note how the law 
might normatively change in this light.   I will then apply this 
general  analysis  to  the  question  of  domain  name 
assignment by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN).  
 II.PSYCHOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF  LAW
More and more, legal institutions and practice are being 
questioned  on  the  basis  of  empirical  behavioral  science.1 
This  follows  an  older  tradition  of  revisions,  and  even 
revolutions, in law brought about by technological change, 
as well as questioning of law in the light of new technology.2 
It is thus a natural step to look at the effects of changing 
technology on the law from a behavioral perspective.  This 
involves trying to understand the psychological background 
against  which  law  is  made,  and  how  law  reacts  to 
technology.   Many  of  the  phenomena  that  are  discussed 
below infra have been recognized by legal scholars without 
much reference to the academic psychology literature.  My 
intention  here  is  to  deepen the  analysis  by  making  such 
connections explicit, and to suggest, as others have done, 
that  psychological  and  other  empirical  social  science 
research has much to say about the foundations of law. 
1See, e.g. Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:  How State of Mind 
Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 
How. L. J. 49, 1-30 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.howard.edu/dictator/media/229/how_49_1.pdf (last 
visited March 2, 2008)
2See, e.g. Lawrence Lessig, An Information Society: Free or Feudal?, THE 
COOK REPORT ON THE INTERNET,  102-104 (July-Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/pc2/visionaries/lessig.pdf (last visited March 
2, 2008).
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 A.  The Making of Law and Legal Conservatism
The establishment of law in most instances throughout 
history has resulted in, even if it is not initially supported by, 
a force of legal conservatism. Conservative philosophies are 
ones that uphold tradition and/or the status quo, and I will 
use  “legal  conservatism”  to  refer  to  the  foundational 
commonality  of  principles,  systemic  attributes,  and 
practices that support established social arrangements and 
vested interests.  “Established” and “vested” here refer to 
arrangements  and  interests  having  relatively  high  status 
and  resources  within  a  society.   Systemic  aspects  of  law 
such as precedent and constitutions, doctrines such as stare 
decisis and constitutionalism, and institutional phenomena 
such  as  incumbency  advantage  and  capture  are  all 
manifestations of legal conservatism.   Legal conservatism 
can be at odds with other forms of conservatism, such as 
social  conservatism.   A  legal  regime  that  supports 
commercial interests, for example, can make it easier for a 
large  retail  chain  to  disrupt  a  traditional  community,  by 
displacing local  businesses and making material  available 
for  sale  that  contradicts  community  values.   So,  legal 
conservatism  competes  not  just  with  legal  progressivism 
(which favors the leveling of status and resources) but also 
with other forms of conservatism, including forms that favor 
a return to previous arrangements (the status quo ante). 
I am claiming that legal conservatism is built into the law 
at its core, which makes it a phenomenon for social science 
to  explain.   The  foundations  and  institutions  of  law  are 
descriptively much less responsive to quantitative empirical 
research from social science than are the particulars of law. 
Statutes,  rule  making,  and  case  decisions  often  cite 
quantitative  empirical  studies  that  either  augment  or 
overturn pre-research viewpoints. But debates about more 
general  legal  principles  usually  revolve  around  intuitive 
judgments,  with  stories,  historical  examples,  widely 
accepted norms,  and  hypothetical   scenarios  forming the 
basis  of  arguments.  Legal  conservatism  also  makes  it 
difficult  for  changes  in  technology  to  overturn  legal 
principles and institutions when such changes would conflict 
with vested interests.   Principles of  human behavior  from 
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experimental  psychology  and  other  social  science 
literatures, together with the potential of new technologies 
to  invalidate  assumptions  built  into  existing  laws,  give  a 
rhetorical boost to progressive arguments in the foundations 
of law, and may ultimately be a basis for overturning legal 
conservatism itself.  
 i. Behavioral Research and Lawmaking
Research  in  psychology  has  documented  widespread 
human tendencies that bias our intuitions in  the direction of 
legal conservatism.  The term “bias” in this literature refers 
to  the  difference  between,  on  one  hand,  the  behavioral 
pattern at play when real action occurs and, on the other 
hand, a normatively derived possible response that may be 
counterfactual.  The meaning of “bias” should become clear 
through its use in the examples that follow.  The implication 
is that if one accepts that these tendencies are present in 
lawmaking  -  among  legislators,  bureaucrats,  lawyers, 
judges, and the public - and that they represent biases away 
from a more defensible normative standard, then these facts 
are  arguments  against  legal  conservatism  and  the 
institutional  practices  that  manifest  it.   Revising  legal 
philosophy  in  light  of  new  knowledge  about  psychology 
might therefore be seen as a process of bias correction.3  
 a) Status Quo Bias
Other things being equal, most people tend to favor the 
status  quo  over  a  change.   Psychologists  and  behavioral 
economists have labeled this effect the  status quo bias. In 
one  study,  students  in  economics  courses  were  asked  to 
make hypothetical choices between options, with some of 
the students having been told in some way that one of the 
options  was  the  status  quo  (e.g.  “You  are  currently  a 
professor at College A in the midwest.  Recently, you have 
been approached by  colleagues at  other  universities  with 
job  opportunities.  Your  choices  are:”),  while  others  were 
3Cf. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, J LEGAL 
STUDIES 35, 199-241 (2006). The approach of Jolls and Sunstein is more of 
an attempt to use the law to counteract biases in the citizenry, rather 
than using behavioral science to question the foundations of law. 
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asked to select from the same set of options without one 
being  designated  the  status  quo  (e.g.  “Having  just 
completed your graduate degree,  you have four  offers  of 
teaching jobs in hand. Your choices are:”).  The researchers 
found  that  an  option  was  significantly  more  likely  to  be 
chosen if it was designated as the status quo,4 and that the 
advantage of the status quo increased with the number of 
options.5 
Many other demonstrations of the status quo bias exist. 
Anecdotally, students at colleges with semester terms, for 
example,  tend  to  prefer  semesters  over  quarters,  while 
students  at  colleges  with  quarter  terms  tend  to  prefer 
quarters.  Field  studies  have  shown  that  people  tend  to 
remain  with  whatever  default  pension  plan,  insurance 
policy, or utility service to which they are assigned, rather 
than switching to something that might be better, and that 
the status quo preference exists across different options for 
the same decisions.6  
The status quo bias tends to take effect as soon as an 
option is labeled as the status quo, and has been shown to 
exist for many policy decisions.7  Furthermore, it exists even 
for investment exchange decisions in which there are little 
to  no  costs  associated  with  change,  so  a  normative 
transaction cost explanation is difficult to support.8  
There  is  some evidence,  however,  that  the status  quo 
bias depends on an inference that the status quo is a signal 
of value.  In experimental markets, people have been shown 
to be reluctant to trade away whichever object (e.g. a coffee 
mug versus a chocolate bar) they have been given by an 
experimenter, a finding sometimes termed the endowment 
effect.9  But the effect is sensitive to methodological details, 
and  disappears  when  the  experimenter  tells  participants 
4William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, J OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 1, 12-26 (1988). 
5Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: 
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 5, 193, 197-198 (1991).
6Id. at 198-199.
7Avital Moshinsky and Maya Bar-Hillel, Loss Aversion and the Status Quo 
Label Bias, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, 
Hebrew University, Jerusalem (2005), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/huj/dispap/dp373.html (last visited Feb. 29, 
2008).
8SAMUELSON AND ZECKHAUSER, supra note 4 at 12-13.
9KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH, AND THALER, supra note 5, at 194-197.
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that the commodity they have been given was determined 
by a coin flip.10 In other experiment and field studies, the 
suggestion  value  of  the  status  quo  remains  a  plausible 
explanation  for  the status  quo bias.  An inference that  an 
option  has  more  value because it  is  the  status  quo may 
nonetheless  rely  on  the  false  assumption  that  the  option 
was selected in the past for a good reason.  People appear 
to assume this  by default  unless it  is  transparently false, 
and they tend to forgo a de novo evaluation of possibilities 
which  might  be  in  their  interest  (e.g.  in  the  case  of 
investment decisions). 
Applied to lawmaking, the status quo bias thus implies an 
advantage for established law over and above  what can be 
argued for philosophically.  The empirical  research implies 
that human nature is imbued with this tendency. We should 
take this into account when evaluating arguments for the 
status quo, and realize that some portion of the expressed 
sentiment probably has no rational basis.  
 b)Biased Assimilation
People tend to incorporate new evidence and arguments 
into their beliefs in a way that is biased toward preserving 
prior beliefs, especially when such beliefs are strongly held. 
In a well-known experiment by social  psychologists,  when 
shown two research studies supporting opposite sides of the 
capital  punishment debate,  both students  in  favor  of and 
those  opposing the  death  penalty  accepted  evidence 
consistent with their prior beliefs, but they were very critical 
of  opposing evidence.  In  fact,  the same evidence caused 
both groups  to  become  more  confident  of  their  views. 
Normatively, mixed evidence should bring the two groups 
closer together, but instead it pushed them farther apart.11 
This phenomenon is known as “biased assimilation”, and it 
has  also  been  demonstrated observationally,  for  example 
with the  audiences for  presidential  debates  in  the United 
States. Supporters of a candidate are overwhelmingly more 
10Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly 
Interpreted as Evidence for Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect 
Theory?, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 97, 1449, 1461-1462 (2007).
11Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper,  Biased Assimilation 
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, J OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 37, 2098 (1979). 
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likely  than  opponents  to  see  their  favored  candidate  as 
having won a debate,12 and debates tend to strengthen each 
group's belief in their favored candidate.13  
The  implication  of  biased  assimilation  research  for 
lawmaking is that new evidence and arguments are unlikely 
to have the effect they deserve to have when a principle of 
law is well  established, because those who make law can 
interpret new evidence so as to preserve the principle when 
they  already  believe  in  it.   This  would  be  another  bias 
toward legal conservatism.  It might be tempting to argue 
that judges, at least, can be more neutral than the average 
person.   A  follow-up to  the  death  penalty  study provides 
reason to doubt this, however.  When people were asked to 
be “as  objective and unbiased as possible”, they were just 
as biased as before.14  The facts that (a) appellate judges 
often  vote  on  opposite  sides  from  one  another  despite 
hearing the same arguments, and (b) these differences tend 
to  follow  consistent  patterns  across  cases,  show  that 
different  prior  dispositions  among  judges  strongly  affect 
their  decisions.   The biased assimilation literature implies 
that most people responsible for making laws are unlikely to 
approach  new  questions  in  a  way  that  is  as  open  to 
overturning established law as newly available facts might 
warrant. 
 c) Self-Serving Biases in Fairness Judgments
People  tend  to  interpret  ambiguities  in  questions  of 
fairness  in  ways  that  benefit  themselves.   In  one 
experiment,  survey  takers  were  given  an  opportunity  to 
dictate  relative  payments  for  their  work  as  survey 
respondents.  When they were told that another participant 
(an  experimental  confederate)  had  to  leave  early,  the 
12Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, Public Opinion and Political 
Action, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, THIRD EDITION (Gardner Lindzey and 
Elliot Aronson eds., Random House, 1985).
13Geoffrey D. Munro, Peter H. Ditto, Lisa K. Lockhart, Angela Fagerlin, 
Mitchell Gready, and Elizabeth Peterson, Biased Assimilation of 
Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate, 
BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 24, 15 (2002).
14Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper, and Elizabeth Preston, Considering the 
Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, J OF PERSONALITY AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 1231, 1238 (1984).  Generally on this topic see David 
G. Myers, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, NINTH EDITION (McGraw Hill, 2006) at 77-79.
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survey  takers  gave  themselves  more  money  than  the 
purported fellow participant when they either worked longer 
or completed  more  questionnaires.   They only  allocated 
money  evenly  when  there  was  no  basis  for  a  different 
allocation. The  fact  that  people  allocate  evenly  when  no 
fairness  argument  can  be  adduced  for  doing  otherwise 
illustrates a general principle about biases: that they may 
be largely unconscious. People strive to be fair to others – 
they just tend to be self-serving when it is not obvious how 
to be unbiased.15  
Putting  this  finding  together  with  the  status  quo  bias 
implies that people will accept and may even try to justify 
inequalities favoring themselves that they would not impose 
de  novo.   Those  who  make  the  law tend  to  be  more 
advantaged than the average person and to be well-served 
by existing social practices. The implication for lawmaking is 
that those who make law will therefore be less likely than a 
representative sample of the population would be to favor 
progressive laws, in other words biasing  lawmaking toward 
legal conservatism.  
 d)System Justification and Conservatism
A  bias  toward  established  arrangements  that  benefit 
oneself might be seen as rational from the point of view of 
neoclassical  economic  theory.   But  the  status  quo  bias 
experiments  discussed  supra suggest  that  support  for 
existing conditions goes beyond mere self-interest.  Indeed, 
John Jost and colleagues have done studies that support a 
general  theory  they  call  “system  justification,”16 which 
posits  that  people  are  strongly  biased  toward  supporting 
existing social systems - even when they are disadvantaged 
by  them.  System  justification  theory  builds  on  several 
findings  from  earlier  literature,  including  “cognitive 
dissonance”  experiments,  “tolerance  of  injustice”  among 
the disadvantaged, and a widespread need to believe in a 
15Eddy van Avermaet, Equity: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
(Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1974), 
described in Jonathan Baron, THINKING AND DECIDING, THIRD EDITION (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 425-426.
16John T. Jost and Orsalya Hunyady, The Psychology of System 
Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, EUROPEAN REV. OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 13, 111 (2002).
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“just world” in order to perceive that we control our fate.   A 
number of  original  predictions from the theory have been 
confirmed,  including  that  likely  events  are  judged  to  be 
more  desirable  than  unlikely  events,  and  that  system 
justification levels are higher in societies with more extreme 
social and economic inequality.   
Jost and colleagues have studied conservative ideology 
directly  as  well  and  found  in  an  international  study  that 
individual  adherence  to  conservatism  correlates  with 
motivational needs.  They write: 
“The  core  ideology  of  conservatism  stresses  resistance  to 
change  and  justification  of  inequality  and  is  motivated  by 
needs that  vary  situationally  and dispositionally  to  manage 
uncertainty and threat.”17  
All of this work implies that there is a general tendency 
among  both  advantaged  and  disadvantaged  groups  to 
support  existing  legal  systems,  and  that  personal  and 
situational  factors  make some people  especially  prone to 
this tendency.   The tendency to justify existing systems is at 
least in part a bias, however, because its consequences are 
often either neutral with respect to, or at odds with, both 
self-interest  and  doing  what  is  fairest  for  everyone. 
Whenever  philosophical  arguments  are  offered  for  legal 
conservatism  as  providing  the  best  overall  outcomes  for 
society, we should balance them against system justification 
tendencies  which  people  exhibit  even  when  an  existing 
system has no advantages for oneself or for others.
 e) The Iron Law of Oligarchy
The sociologist  Robert  Michels  coined the phrase “iron 
law of oligarchy” to describe a phenomenon he observed in 
organizations, such as political parties, which are structured 
to  make  decisions.   The  iron  law  claims  that  all  such 
organizations,  regardless  of  how  democratic  (or,  for  that 
matter,  autocratic) they are at their beginning, eventually 
become oligarchies: dominated by a small elite.18  Although 
17John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway, 
Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 
129, 339 (2003).
18Robert Michels–, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL 
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden and Cedar Paul, translators., Hearst's 
International Library Company, 1915).
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the  “iron”  nature  of  Michels'  law  has  been  plausibly 
challenged,19  the  mechanisms  of  coalescing  power  that 
Michels  and  later  adherents  put  forward  to  explain  the 
empirical  observations  on  which  it  was  based  give  it 
plausibility  as  a  general  tendency.   Especially  when  an 
organization  is  large,  or  grows  to  be  large  in  population, 
resources, responsibilities, or power,  bureaucratic structure 
and specialization have some efficiency advantages in the 
face of barriers to mass participation. When combined with 
human  psychological  tendencies  toward  self-preservation, 
enjoyment  of  power  and  privilege,  promoting  like 
underlings,  system  justification,  and  identification  of 
followers with their leaders, these efficiency advantages are 
often invoked to favor hierarchical forms that are mirrored 
by social status. 
The mechanisms of oligarchy formation and maintenance 
are important, because most forms of organization that are 
typically proposed for governance give these mechanisms a 
strong  foothold.  In  a  well-studied,  conscious  attempt  to 
avoid Michels' law, for instance, the German Green Party in 
the 1980s adopted a loose structure without regular office 
holders  and  with  strong  rights  for  party  members  to 
participate in decisions.   As it  grew in power, however, it 
took  on  a  more  oligarchic  form  in  order  to  organize 
effectively and win national offices.20  Oligarchy can emerge 
as a response to the exigencies of the world in which an 
organization is embedded, for example the need to compete 
for political power in a large nation-state. The persistence of 
the  oligarchic  tendency,  while  not,  as  Michels  seemed to 
believe,  strictly  impossible  to  overcome,  nonetheless 
suggests  an  additional  source  of  bias  toward  legal 
conservatism.  Law tends to be made and decided upon by 
organizations that are prone to oligarchy, and is often set up 
as such from the beginning. To the extent that legal elites 
share the interests of other elites, and work in entrenched 
19See Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: 
Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, AMERICAN J OF 
SOCIOLOGY 106, 303 (2000); Julie Fisher, Is the Iron Law of Oligarchy 
Rusting Away in the Third World?, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 22, 129 (1994).
20See Frieder Otto Wolf, Whatever Happened to the German Greens?, RED 
PEPPER, (August 2003), available online at 
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article93.html;  Charles Lees, THE RED-GREEN 
COALITION IN GERMANY: POLITICS, PERSONALITYS, AND POWER  (Manchester University 
Press, 2001).
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structures, law itself will tend to have inertia and will tend to 
favor established interests. 
 ii. Technology and Lawmaking
New  technologies  can  often  be  disruptive,  threatening 
those who are benefited by existing practices.  The Internet, 
for  example,  has  been  widely  pointed  to  as  a  disruptive 
technology,  reducing  the  reach  of  businesses  such  as 
compact discs,  print  periodicals,  976 phone services,  and 
network television.   In such cases, technology pushes in the 
opposite  direction  from  legal  conservatism.   While  legal 
conservatism  favors  existing  arrangements,  disruptive 
technology  undermines  them.   Thus,  the  behavioral 
tendencies described supra favor a legal philosophy that is 
at odds with one of the main features of contemporary life in 
the United States and elsewhere: technological change that 
undermines existing practices. 
A partial consequence of this tension is what has been 
called  the  “losers'  paradox:”   lawmakers  tend  to  support 
industries whose business models have been disrupted by a 
new  technology,  because  these  “losers”  focus  their 
accumulated resources and relationships with government 
on  lobbying  for  laws  that  protect  them  against  this 
disruption.21  The  institutional  manifestations  of  legal 
conservatism (the persistence of laws, precedent, capture, 
and the like) give these actors many advantages in steering 
the law toward their interests.  In a system such as that in 
the United States,  where wealth can buy lobbying power, 
the  process  might  be  thought  of  as  a  positive  feedback 
cycle: law benefits established interests, who put some of 
their gains back into the shaping of law to give them more 
advantages.  The presence of  new technology alternatives 
may  or  may  not  provide  enough  negative  feedback  to 
neutralize  the  advantage  of  incumbents,  who may  either 
succumb to a disruptive technology or successfully prevent 
its widespread adoption through law or market power.
Disruptive  technologies  can  result  in  substantial 
21See Richard E. Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Entry and 
Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers, J OF THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 5, 1064 (2007). See also Lawrence Lessig's blog post 
and discussion at http://lessig.org/blog/2004/08/the_losers_paradox.html 
(last visited March 15, 2008).
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improvements in  social  welfare:  for  example,  vastly  more 
people  having  access  to  information,  entertainment,  and 
capabilities  to  affect  the  world.   Thus,  if  we  ground 
lawmaking in legal conservatism, we may be interfering with 
such improvements.22  If legal conservatism is partly based 
on  psychological  biases  away  from  what  is  normatively 
rational, then we have an additional reason to question it. 
Thus, both the likelihood of  technological  change and the 
findings  of  behavioral  research  encourage  us  to  question 
legal conservatism and its manifestations.
 B. Legal Concepts and Incremental Refinement
While the process of lawmaking is characterized by legal 
conservatism, the application of law to particular cases is 
characterized  by  incremental  refinement of  concepts  and 
rules.  The law in the United States is based on rules from 
common  law,  the  Constitution,  statutes,  and  regulations. 
And concepts are refined over time through their application 
to cases.  The advantage of this is that the law is codified: 
actors  can  predict  with  some  accuracy  whether  a 
contemplated  action  is  legal,  based  on  written  rules  and 
how they have been interpreted in the past.  This way of 
applying law can  be  at  odds with  both  utilitarianism and 
democracy, however.  A utilitarian decision is just the one 
that  produces  the  best  outcome in  a  particular  situation, 
rendering  legal  rules  unnecessary.23  And  a  democratic 
decision  usually  just  depends  on  the  judgments  of  the 
voters,  who  do  not  need  to  agree  on  (or  even  to  know 
about)  legal  rules  in  order  to  vote,  and  who  might 
collectively  prefer  an  outcome  at  odds  with  preexisting 
rules.24  
Of course,  having rules might be preferred under both 
22Improvements in aggregate welfare can made into Pareto 
improvements, in which no one is made worse off, through Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation of the “losers”. But in practice this seldom happens, and 
can be difficult to justify when it requires nullifying all of the future gains 
on which incumbents had been counting. See Joe B. Stevens, THE 
ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 47-50, 71 (Westview Press, 1993).
23Jonathan Baron, Moral Heuristics and Biases  (Society for Judgment and 
Decision Making, Presidential Address, November 19, 2007), slides 
available at http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/talks/sjdm.htm (last 
visited March 1, 2008).
24See Ian Shapiro,, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE, Yale University Press (1999).
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utilitarian and democratic decision making, but incremental 
refinement - a process that begins with rules and concepts, 
and  then defines what these mean as cases arise -  is not 
the only way to develop legal principles that can be widely 
understood  in  advance  of  contemplated  actions. 
Incremental  refinement  is  a  top-down  process,  in  which 
preexisting rules  are presumed to  cover novel  cases that 
were not anticipated when the rules were developed.  An 
alternative  would be to  write  rules  only  after  cases  have 
arisen, and to seek consistency across cases that are clearly 
similar.   Rules would then be well  defined and known for 
familiar  actions,  but  truly  novel  actions,  such  as 
downloading or uploading a music file on the Internet right 
after the technology became available, would have no law 
associated with them.  Whether an action was novel would, 
of  course,  be up for  dispute,  but  the question of  novelty 
would be a decision point, rather than being assumed away 
as a consequence of legal practice. New rules and concepts 
would have to be written before any law could be applied to 
novel cases.  We might call this more bottom-up approach 
incremental  synthesis in  order  to  distinguish  it  from 
incremental refinement.
 i. Behavioral Research and Legal Concepts
Just as human psychology biases lawmaking toward legal 
conservatism,  our  psychology  leads  us  to  apply  legal 
concepts  through  incremental  refinement,  rather  than 
through  incremental  synthesis.   The development of  legal 
concepts  therefore  recapitulates  the  development  of 
concept  understanding  in  individual  humans,  which  is 
characterized  by  two  phenomena  that  are  particularly 
relevant  in  discussing  the  law:  progressive  differentiation 
and over-generalization. 
 a)  Progressive Differentiation of Concepts
Research  has  shown  that,  from an  early  age,  children 
learn  concepts  through  progressive  differentiation  -  first 
learning  general  distinctions  between  objects  such  as 
animate-inanimate,  then  learning  about  different  kinds  of 
objects within each category, descending down a hierarchy 
Global Business & Development Law Journal 15
of more specialized concepts.  For example, the child learns 
“bird” before “robin” or “canary.” 
This mirrors the process of incremental refinement in the 
institutional development of legal concepts.  The concept of 
“murder” has been refined into different  “degrees”,  been 
distinguished from “manslaughter”,  etc.,  over  time.   This 
seems so natural that it is hard to imagine how it could be 
otherwise, and indeed the psychological evidence suggests 
that  we  refine  legal  concepts  incrementally  because  this 
matches  the  way  we  learn  concepts  as  individuals.   But 
progressive  differentiation  in  human  conceptual 
development appears to be a consequence of the way our 
brains  evolved,  to  do  computations  in  a  way  that  favors 
mapping  perceptual  data  onto  more  and  more  refined 
concepts  as  we  acquire  experience.25 The  brain  exhibits 
hysteresis  –  it  has  evolved  not  as  an  optimal  design  for 
every task it may face in the modern world, but rather as a 
path-dependent series of structural changes selected for at 
different  times  and  in  different  environments.26  In  other 
computational architectures that we might imagine, concept 
development could proceed very differently, in particular via 
what  I  have  called  incremental  synthesis.    In  this 
hypothetical world, a child with such an alternatively styled 
brain  might  learn  first  to  recognize  robins,  and  upon 
encountering  her  first  canary  might  then  not  apply  any 
concept to the canary, instead recognizing that it is a novel 
object,  and  then  construct  a  new superordinate  category 
“bird” which would represent the common features of robins 
and canaries.  
 b)  Overgeneralization
Related to progressive differentiation is the phenomenon 
in  human  conceptual  development  known  as 
25Timothy T. Rogers and James L. McClelland, A Parallel Distributed 
Processing Approach to Semantic Cognition: Applications to Conceptual 
Development, in BUILDING OBJECT CATEGORIES IN DEVELOPMENTAL TIME, chapter 14 
(Lisa Gershkoff-Stowe and David H. Rakison, eds., Laurence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2005), available at 
http://www.cnbc.cmu.edu/~jlm/papers/RogersMcCIPSympChap.pdf (last 
visited March 2, 2008).
26See Salvatore Rizzello, Knowledge as a Path Dependent Process, J oF 
BIOECONOMICS  6, 255, 266-267 (2004); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as 
Process and as Product of Thought, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REV. 68, 1 (1978).
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overgeneralization.  This occurs when a child assumes that 
new instances of a category will have the features that past 
learned instances of the category have had.  For example, 
the child might infer, falsely, that all animals have legs. As 
the  concept  space  is  differentiated  and  the  child  learns 
about animals, such as snakes, that do not have legs, this 
rule falls away for the newly learned categories of animals, 
although  having  legs  lingers  as  a  prototypical  feature  of 
animals. 
Overgeneralization in the law follows as a consequence 
of the incremental refinement of legal concepts.  Rules are 
based on concepts, such as “property”, and the rules that 
apply  to  a  concept  are  based  on  features  which  familiar 
instances of the concept share.  If the concept of “property” 
is based initially only on tangible property, then it  will  be 
built into the concept of “property” that it cannot be given 
to  someone  else  without  losing  its  use  for  oneself.  This 
feature might then have many consequences for rules about 
property  that  would  be  inappropriate  for  “intellectual 
property”.
 ii. Technology and Concept Evolution
Technological  change can disrupt  our  understanding of 
concepts, just as it disrupts established social arrangements 
and  business  models.  This  is  partly  because  technology 
produces concepts that are novel at the time the technology 
is first introduced. The name for a novel concept may be 
familiar (“tag”, “file”...) or unfamiliar (“wiki”, “blog”...).  And 
of course it will usually be an instance of some higher level 
concept that is already familiar and is happily recognized as 
such  (“communication”,  “text”...).  But  the  novel  concept 
may fail to share crucial features with previous instances of 
a familiar concept which people attempt to apply to it.  A 45 
RPM single and an MP3 file are both instances of recorded 
music. But if the rules developed for recorded music assume 
features, such as the requirement to expend raw materials 
and labor in order to produce another copy, that are present 
in  the  familiar  instance  (the  vinyl  record)  but  not  in  the 
novel one (the digital MP3 file), then it may be inappropriate 
to apply these rules to the novel case.27  
27See Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE (Penguin Press, 2004) at 183-207, 
Global Business & Development Law Journal 17
The characteristics of concept evolution stemming from 
technological change suggest that an incremental synthesis 
model  for  developing  law  around  new  technology  makes 
more sense than an incremental refinement model. This is 
true  because,  and to  the  extent  that,  technology creates 
novel  concepts.   When a  concept  is  novel,  this  does not 
mean that no higher level concept can be applied to it, but it 
does mean that attempts to project features of a preexisting 
concept  onto  the  novel  case  may  fail  and  produce 
overgeneralization.   Thus, technology pushes us toward a 
different model for legal concept development from the one 
that our psychology naturally suggests, and, as before, the 
fact that our behavioral tendency represents one way to do 
things, and not necessarily the best way, calls its application 
to  the  law  into  question.   As  an  alternative,  we  might 
embrace  the  incremental  synthesis model.  Rather  than 
assuming that familiar concepts and principles must apply 
to  unanticipated  situations,  we  could  wait  until  we  have 
enough  experience  with  novel  actions  to  know  how  we 
should classify them and what the rules should be.
 III. SIMPLE NONRIVAL GOODS
We are now ready to begin applying the behavioral and 
technological principles discussed in section II to substantive 
legal issues, which will end in an analysis of domain name 
regulation.   Let  us  begin  with  an  analysis  of  the 
superordinate class of goods to which the relevant principles 
will apply, namely what I will call simple nonrival goods.  
 A.  Nonrival Goods, Excludability, and Public Goods
A  good is  anything that has positive utility.28  Thus,  at 
least  some  people  would  prefer  having  the  good  to  not 
having it.  The good is rival if one person's use of the good 
interferes with another's. Rival goods are assumed to have 
positive economic value, because people prefer to be able 
to use the good and not to be interfered with while doing so. 
available at http://www.free-culture.cc/freecontent/ (last visited March 1, 
2008). 
28It is often distinguished from a bad, something with negative utility. 
See David W. Pearce, ed., THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 177 (MIT 
Press, 1983).
18  A Behavioral Perspective on Technology Evolution
A nonrival good is a good whose use by one person does not 
interfere  with  another's  use  of  it.  A  nonrival  good  can 
acquire  economic  value  if  use  of  it  can  be  externally 
controlled, and in this case we say the good is excludable.  A 
good  that  is  both  nonrival  and nonexcludable  is  called  a 
public good, and it is assumed that no one will pay money to 
use it, since access to the good is not limited.  A television 
signal is an example of a nonrival but excludable good. One 
person's use of the signal does not interfere with another's, 
but the signal can be scrambled so that one must purchase 
a device or service in order to decode the signal.29
Excludability is a slippery concept, because any good can 
be  made  excludable  through  sufficiently  heavy  handed 
means.  Use  of  the  good  can  be  made  contingent  on 
payment of a fee, for example, and those who use the good 
without paying the fee could be punished, with or without 
the aid of the law.  Thus, the excludability of any good is up 
for  discussion  by  lawmakers.30 But  we  can  distinguish 
between excludability which depends on law (e.g., through 
license fees)  and that  which does not  (e.g.,  scrambling a 
broadcast  signal),  and  call  anything  that  is  nonrival  and 
nonexcludable without  legal  enforcement a  natural  public 
good. 
 B. Simple Goods
I  am going to  define “simple goods” (a  neologism) as 
those  which  do  not  require  creative  production.   A  tree 
found in nature, an undeveloped plot of land, and the air we 
breathe are all  clearly examples of  simple goods. But we 
could extend the definition to include many artificial objects 
whose production does not require creative labor on the part 
of  any named producer.  An ordinary cup of  coffee and a 
piece of standard rope, for example, would qualify. Whoever 
invented these goods has long since died, and knowledge of 
how to make them is quite common.  
I  define goods as simple not to denigrate them, but to 
mark  them out  as  goods  for  which  claims  of  intellectual 
29STEVENS supra note 22 at 59-60.
30Id. at 360-361. The same can be said for rivalness as well. 
Governments may make a naturally rival good such as bread effectively 
nonrival by providing all of the good that everyone needs for free.
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property cannot plausibly be made. 
 C. Simple Nonrival Goods: Examples
Examples  of  simple  nonrival  goods  include 
electromagnetic  frequencies  and  most  familiar,  individual 
words.  Both are very useful, of course. Frequencies can be 
used for telecommunication (e.g. radio, TV), visual designs 
(colors),  and  other  applications  (microwave  ovens,  x-ray 
scans).   And  words  are  obviously  necessary  for  the  way 
humans  communicate.   The  claim  that  broadcast 
frequencies,  in  particular,  are  nonrival   has  only  become 
possible  recently  and  is  still  contentious.   Whereas 
traditional broadcasting has taken place on set frequencies, 
and  nearby  users  of  those  same  frequencies  can  create 
signal  interference,  advances  in  technology  have  made 
possible the sharing of frequencies by arbitrary numbers of 
people using devices appropriately equipped to differentiate 
signals being carried on the same frequencies.31  
Most  familiar  words  are  obviously  simple  goods  in  the 
sense that we do not know who coined them and they are 
commonly  known.   They  are  also  generally  nonrival, 
because one person's use of a word in a sentence does not 
interfere  with  someone  else's  use  of  it.  While  there  are 
examples of words that do not fit the simple nonrival goods 
definition (e.g. “kleenex,” “compunicating”), the point is just 
that many words do fit the definition.  
 D.Observations about Simple Nonrival Goods
The point of defining a class of simple nonrival goods is, I 
argue, that goods in this category share a common set of 
characteristics  with  regard  to  property  and  rights 
assignments.  The justification usually offered in legal theory 
for granting property rights is based on rival goods: property 
rights avoid the tragedy of the commons, in which people's 
uses  of  a  rival  good  interfere  with  each  other,  but  the 
individuals have an incentive to use as much as they can 
31See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 
HARVARD J OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 16, 25, 38-47 (2002), available at 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v16/16HarvJLTech025.pdf (last 
visited March 2, 2008).
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rather than restricting their use for the good of everyone.32 
This justification does not apply to most cases of intellectual 
property, however, because the underlying good is nonrival. 
In the case of patents this has always been the case.  An 
idea can be used by someone without their use interfering 
with another's use of it.  
For copyrighted works, the nonrival nature of information 
has  only  recently  become so  apparent,  since  an  Internet 
user can send her friend a digital file and still retain that file 
on  her  own  computer.  Nonetheless,  the  concept  of 
intellectual  property  from  the  beginning  was  based  on 
rewarding  and  incentivizing  creative  production.   Simple 
nonrival goods do not require creativity in their production, 
and there is  no tragedy of  the commons associated with 
them, so both of the standard arguments for propertization 
fail to apply to simple nonrival goods.33 
Nonetheless,  property  and  other  exclusive  rights  are 
sometimes granted for simple nonrival goods. One example 
appears  to  be  naturally  occurring  genes  in  the  human 
genome, which can now be patented, supposedly because 
granting patent  rights  to  genes incentivizes  research and 
development  into  their  use  for  improving  human 
outcomes.34  Another  example  is  the  continued  exclusive 
licensing  of  spectrum  frequencies,  despite  the  fact  that 
technology  appears  to  have  made  arguments  based  on 
interference obsolete.  As Yochai Benkler has pointed out, 
granting  exclusive  rights  to  use  frequencies  creates  a 
tragedy of the anticommons in which it becomes practically 
impossible  to pull  together the necessary resources for  a 
common  purpose,  for  example,  creating  wide  band 
spectrum for mesh networks and cognitive radios.  Rights 
holders demand payment for use of their frequencies, and 
the transaction costs and fees required can make projects 
32The tragedy of the commons justification for property goes back at 
least to Aristotle, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett, tr., 350 B.C.E.) at 2-5, 
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.2.two.html (last 
visited March 1, 2008).  See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, SCIENCE 162, 1243-1248 (1968).
33See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
TEXAS L REV. 83, 1031, 1051 (2005).
34Kyle Jensen and Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the 
Human Genome, SCIENCE 310, 239 (2005), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summary/310/5746/239 (last 
visited March 2, 2008).
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that depend on multiple frequencies uneconomical.35
A  further  observation  about  the  economics  of  simple 
nonrival goods is that if an exclusive right to such a good is 
granted, then it can be tremendously valuable. Value is not 
determined by creativity. “Travel.com” was a very valuable 
domain name from the beginning, but is not very creative 
compared  to  “Travelocity.com”,  although  the  latter  would 
have been less valuable before the company by that name 
had been started. 
 E. Loss Aversion and Rights Assignment
The  most  frequently  cited  theoretical  contribution  by 
psychologists  to  economics  is  prospect  theory,  a  key 
component of which is the empirical phenomenon known as 
loss aversion. Simply stated, loss aversion is the finding that 
for most people in most choice situations, perceived losses 
loom larger than perceived gains.   This can be illustrated 
through  decisions  which  involve  losses  and  gains  on 
different  dimensions  of  comparison.    In  one experiment, 
participants were divided at random into two groups.  The 
“dinner group” received one free dinner at a restaurant and 
a monthly calendar from their university. The “photo group” 
received  a  professional  photo  portrait  plus  the  same 
monthly calendar as the dinner group.  Participants in the 
two groups were then asked whether they would like to keep 
their gift, or trade it for either (a) two free dinners at the 
restaurant  or  (b)  a  professional  photo  portrait  plus  five 
smaller photo prints.   Only 11% of participants kept their 
original gift, and in both groups a majority chose to trade for 
the  gift  that  was  better  on  the  distinguishing  dimension 
(81% of the dinner group chose a and 52% of the photo 
group chose b).  This illustrates that people, when they do 
opt out of the status quo, prefer to avoid losing what they 
already have.36
 i. Variables Affecting Loss Aversion
35BENKLER supra note 31 at 63. .
36Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: 
A Reference-Dependent Model, QUARTERLY J OF ECONOMICS 106, 1039-1061 
(1991).
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The magnitude of the loss aversion ratio increases with 
the seriousness of a loss prospect.  People demand an order 
of  magnitude  more  compensation  for  participating  in  a 
medical experiment with a .001 chance of imminent death 
than they will pay to be cured of a disease with which they 
have just been diagnosed that carries the same risk.37 In this 
example,  agreeing  to  participate  in  the  experiment  is 
experienced as a loss prospect relative to the status quo, 
whereas  being  cured  of  a  disease  one  already  has  is 
experienced as a gain prospect, and the loss prospect looms 
much larger.
Loss  aversion  may  also  be  enhanced  by  prior 
investments of time, money, and other resources.  This sunk 
cost effect may be due to cognitive heuristics that people 
have  adopted,  such  as  “don't  waste”,  which  have  been 
argued to make adult humans less rational about sunk costs 
than children and “lower animals” are.38
A very important point about loss aversion is that people 
experience it relative to a reference point that is subjective: 
perceived losses as opposed to actual  ones.   In a widely 
cited  study,  respondents  (including  doctors)  who  were 
considering the prospect of a dreaded new disease outbreak 
strongly favored (a) a health program that would save 200 
people  for  certain  over  (b)  one  with  a  1/3  probability  of 
saving 600 people who would otherwise not be saved. But 
they  also  strongly  favored  (c)  a  program  with  a  1/3 
probability that no one would die and a 2/3 probability that 
600 people would die over (d) a program in which exactly 
400  people  would  die.   This  pattern  of  preferences  is 
inconsistent, because the two choices are just different ways 
of framing the same certain (a or d) versus uncertain (b or 
c) outcomes. Thus loss aversion can be used to manipulate 
people's preferences based on how prospects are described 
to them.39
37Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J OF 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 1, 39-60 (1980), described in KAHNEMAN, 
KNETSCH, AND THALER, supra note 5 at 201-202.
38Hal R. Arkes and Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are 
Humans Less Rational than Lower Animals?, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 125, 
591-600 (1999).
39Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 39, 341, 343 (1984).
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 ii. Loss Aversion, Perceived Justice, and Property Rights
Loss aversion is closely connected with perceptions of being 
treated  unfairly.   In  one experiment,  63% of  respondents 
thought  that  it  was  unfair  for  a  company  to  decrease 
salaries by 7% in a community experiencing “no inflation”, 
but only 22% thought it was unfair to increase salaries by 
5% in a community experiencing “inflation of  12%”, even 
though both cases involve a 7% reduction in real  wages. 
Framing  this  as  a  gain  changes  people's  perception  of 
fairness.40  Businesses have long heeded this effect. In the 
1980s,  for  example,  gas  stations  offered  a  “discount  for 
cash” but never a “surcharge for credit”, preferring to frame 
the price difference as a gain rather than a loss.
In  surveys  about  environmental  policy,  the  reference 
point for gains and losses often depends on prior rights and 
ownership.   Loss  aversion  in  this  case  is  manifested  in 
respondents  demanding  that  a  corporation  pay  the 
government a much higher price for the right  to develop 
public  land than the amount they are willing to have the 
government pay to recover a comparable plot of privately 
owned land.41  But the feeling of loss aversion depends on 
how  the  question  is  framed.   In  the  case  of  broadcast 
frequencies  in  the  United  States,  for  example,  the 
framework of private control of the airwaves that was put in 
place beginning with the Radio Act of 1927 was sold to the 
public as a way to save the government money: by getting 
the private sector to develop broadcasting, which was seen 
as a cost. Thus, the granting of rights was seen as a gain. 
Once in place, however, these rights became very difficult to 
challenge because they had more economic value than the 
public was apparently willing to pay to recover them.42   
Loss  aversion  is  felt  by  people  not  just  for  tangible 
property  that  they  have  been  given,  but  for  anything  of 
40KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH, AND THALER, supra note 5 at 204.
41Ronald G. Cummings, David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze, 
eds., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS (Rowman and Allanheld, 1986), discussed 
in Id. at 202.
42Yochai Benkler, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (Yale University Press, 2006), at 
195-196, available at http://www.congo-education.net/wealth-of-
networks/ (last visited March 1, 2008). It is quite possible, of course, that 
public willingness was not adequately reflected in the willingness of 
politicians to buy back frequencies, or to create more public 
broadcasting stations on unused frequencies.
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value they have come to see as part of their endowment, 
including rights  and privileges,  status,  freedoms,  abilities, 
and  expected  future  earnings.43  The  effect  is  to  create 
intense motivation to avoid what are perceived to be losses, 
greatly  outweighing  the  motivation  to  achieve  equivalent 
gains.   Indeed,  this  was  recognized  in  1897  by  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who wrote: “It is in the nature of a man's 
mind. A thing which you enjoyed and used as your own for a 
long time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your 
being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the 
act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. 
The law can ask no better justification  than the deepest 
instincts of man.”44  
The  relevance of  this  to  simple  nonrival  goods  is  that 
assigning  exclusive  rights  to  things  like  broadcast 
frequencies and words creates loss aversion.  Rights holders 
are likely to take extraordinary means, even beyond what 
makes economic sense,  to avoid losing their  rights.   This 
may help to explain the ferocity of lobbying by incumbents 
for laws like copyright extension45 and against reforms that 
would  turn  simple  nonrival  goods  into  a  commons,  and 
hence the losers’ paradox.
The lesson for law making is that loss aversion should be 
taken into account before deciding to grant exclusive rights. 
Granting property or other exclusive rights may turn out to 
be  inefficient and  difficult  to  reverse,  because  of  loss 
aversion's  motivating  power  and  the  political-economic 
power of rights holders. 
 F. Barriers to Negotiation
An  additional  factor  that  should  militate  against  the 
granting of rights is that there are psychological barriers to 
negotiation  beyond  the  normal  transaction  costs  when 
parties  might  jointly  benefit  from  an  agreement,  for 
example, to share simple nonrival goods to which one party 
has exclusive rights.  
Prominent among these barriers is what is known in the 
43See KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY supra note 39 at 349.
44KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH, AND THALER supra note 5 at 204. 
45See Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFFAIRS (March-April 
2004), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-
2004/story_lessig_marapr04.msp (last visited March 1, 2008).
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literature  as  reactive  devaluation.  This  occurs  when  the 
mere fact that one side has made an offer makes the other 
side value what is offered less than they would otherwise.  A 
number  of  other  barriers  to  negotiation  have  been 
identified.46  The point here is just that the difficulties facing 
prospective deal makers who must overcome the exclusive 
rights  held  by  some of  them go far  beyond the  costs  of 
doing business, and the psychological barriers can scuttle a 
deal that would otherwise make sense economically.
 G.Technology-enabled Decentralization
As I have argued is the case generally for lawmaking and 
legal evolution, technology change in the U.S. has made a 
strong  culture  of  rights  assignment  for  simple  nonrival 
goods  especially  inappropriate.   For  example,  while 
tradition,  arguments  by  many  economists,  and 
psychological  factors  like  loss  aversion  are  pushing  for 
stronger rights  regimes  for  goods  such  as  broadcast 
frequencies,  the  technology  of  radio  transmission  is 
dramatically reducing the need for frequency rights.47  In the 
next section, I will  apply this point to domain names, first 
arguing  that  names  for  Internet  navigation  are  simple 
nonrival goods, and then showing how adopting a different 
attitude toward names could avoid many problems. 
 IV. DOMAIN NAME REGULATION
The analysis supra gives us a way to think about Internet 
domain names and the Internet Corporation for  Assigning 
Names  and  Numbers  (ICANN),  which  regulates  domain 
names  as  well  as,  indirectly,  the  Internet  Protocol  (IP) 
address numbers to which the names map.  
I  will  argue  six  points:  (A)  Names  are  simple  nonrival 
goods;  (B)  The  hazards  of  rights  assignment  apply  to 
domain  names;  (C)  A  global  domain  name  system  is 
unnecessary;  (D)  Domain  names  cause  many  problems 
which  would  be  avoided  if  names  were  deregulated;  (E) 
ICANN  poses  dangers  of  oligarchy  in  the  control  of 
46See Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL , 389-404 (Oct. 1991).
47BENKLER supra note 31.
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information; and (F) Internet law is an opportunity to evolve 
concepts more appropriately.48
 A. Names are simple nonrival goods
Domain names such as “Disney.com” are currently used 
on  the  Internet  to  navigate  to  servers  controlled  by  the 
owner of  the domain name,  in  this  case the Walt  Disney 
Company.   Disney  pays  an  annual  registration  fee  in 
exchange  for  exclusive  rights  to  the  name  in  the  .com 
generic top level domain (gTLD), and in several other TLDs 
as  well.   But  Disney's  domain  names  have  value  far  in 
excess of the registration costs, and their collective market 
value is probably at least in the hundreds of thousands, if 
not  millions,  of  U.S.  dollars.49  Why  is  this?   The  simple 
reason is that the Domain Name System (DNS) gives the 
name value, because it is one way for users to find Disney's 
website. “Disney.com” is simple to guess and to remember.50
Many well-known businesses, however, get by without a 
domain name that is  easy to guess, and instead use one 
that most customers do not know the first time they visit the 
company's  website.51 Customers  can  usually  find  a 
business's site easily by typing a company's name into the 
keyword box of a search engine such as Google or Yahoo!, 
and the majority apparently do this all the time anyway.52 
The  market  for  domain  names  is  based  on  artificial 
scarcity. There is no limit to the number of TLDs that could 
48For a legal analysis favoring deregulation of domain names, see Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, EMORY LAW J 
54, 507-596 (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID758638_code332758.p
df (last visited March 2, 2008); See also GOLDMAN 2007 infra note 59. 
49 See Bob Sullivan, Domain Name Sells for $2.75 Million, MSNBC (July 
20, 2004),   available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5467584 (last 
visited March 1, 2008).
50Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Domain Names: 
Implementation and Specification (RFC1035) at 2.1, available at 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt (last visited March 1, 2008).
51For example, California's Great America amusement park has the 
domain “pgathrills.com”.  See http://www.pgathrills.com/ (last visited 
March 2, 2008).
52GOLDMAN 2005 supra note 48 at 547-548. See also 
http://corkuniversitypress.typepad.com/cork_university_press/2006/02/p
age/2/ (last visited on March 1, 2008): “The study shows that most 
people use search engines to find even well known websites, like 
ebay.com, google.com, or yahoo.com.”
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be used, and yet very few have been created by ICANN.53  If 
TLDs were allowed to proliferate indefinitely,  then, except 
for trademark considerations, everyone who wanted a given 
name could have it, because no one could buy up every TLD 
for  it.   Premium  TLD  owners  (i.e.  “.com”)  would  retain 
market advantage as long as the domain name system is in 
use,  but  there  appears  to  be  no  reason  to  maintain  this 
system other  than  to  give  advantages  to  current  domain 
name  owners  and  to  direct  funds  toward  ICANN  and  its 
network of registries and registrars. 
Thus, the value of domain names is contingent on the 
existence of a system which most people do not use, and 
which, as I will argue infra, is not necessary.  So names on 
the Internet are in general simple nonrival goods because 
one  website's  use  of  a  name  does  not  interfere  with 
another's to any greater extent than is the case for business 
or  organization  names  generally,  and  that  is  already 
governed by trademark law.54  
 B. The hazards of rights assignment apply to domain names 
As described supra, the problems with assigning rights to 
simple  nonrival  goods  include  the  creation  of  transaction 
costs  when  a  non-rights  holder  wants  to  use  a  name  to 
which  someone  else  holds  the  rights,  and  loss  aversion 
which motivates those who hold rights to act aggressively to 
maintain them.  In this case, many domain name owners 
have paid thousands, and a few in the millions, of dollars for 
their names, so they would presumably have a great deal of 
sunk  cost  loss  aversion  over  the  prospect  of  the  system 
itself going away.55  
Again, we can set aside trademarked names (other than 
those based on the domain name itself), because the use of 
those in commerce is already protected by law.  We are then 
left  with  names  whose  value  stems  from  their  common 
meaning,  and  not  from  association  with  a  particular 
company or  organization.   Ownership  of  a  name such as 
53There are currently 21 gTLDs, listed at 
http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/# (last visited on March 1, 2008).
54ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (October 24, 
1999), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last 
visited March 1, 2008). 
55SULLIVAN, supra note 49.
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“Cars.com”  provides  a  competitive  barrier  against 
potentially superior sites that do not own the favored name, 
and  thus  hurts  consumers  as  well.  In  a  world  without  a 
domain name system, the owner of the name would have to 
compete for market share more purely on the basis of the 
quality of their business. 
So a system without such barriers would therefore likely 
provide better overall welfare. By definition, then, attempts 
to preserve the system, which rights holders are likely to 
continue to do, are welfare diminishing. 
 C. A global domain name system is unnecessary
There  are  many  alternatives  to  a  global  domain  name 
system.  Domain name  resolution  into IP addresses is not 
necessary for navigation.56 Various sites, as well  as users' 
personal  address  books,  could  do  this  mapping  for  web 
navigation, email addressing, and other purposes, similar to 
the way that telephone directories and lists work.  Moreover, 
IP addresses (when the address space is expanded57) are not 
scarce,  are all  about  equally  attractive,  and  can  be 
dispensed either for free or, if an Internet tax is desired, for 
a uniform fee. Private third-party services, such as existing 
search  engines  and  portals,  can  provide  trusted  name 
mapping, and can compete on quality.   Eric Goldman has 
56IETF supra note 50 at 2.1. “The goal of domain names is to provide a 
mechanism for naming resources in such a way that the names are 
usable in different hosts, networks, protocol families, internets, and 
administrative organizations.
“From the user's point of view, domain names are useful as 
arguments to a local agent, called a resolver, which retrieves 
information associated with the domain name.  Thus a user might ask 
for the host address or mail information associated with a particular 
domain name.  To enable the user to request a particular type of 
information, an appropriate query type is passed to the resolver with the 
domain name.  To the user, the domain tree is a single information 
space; the resolver is responsible for hiding the distribution of data 
among name servers from the user.” 
57See Simson Garfinkel, Internet 6.0, TECHNOLOGY REV. (Jan. 7, 2004), 
available at http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/13426/?a=f (last 
visited March 1, 2008).  “The most important thing that IPv6 does is 
quadruple the size of the Internet address field from 32 bits to 128 bits. 
Because in principle, any combination of these 128 bits is a valid 
address, this quadrupling results in a massive increase in space. For 
example, whereas IPv4 could never supply enough addresses for every 
human being on the planet, IPv6 can do that and then some: in fact, 
IPv6 could provide each of us roughly 60 thousand trillion trillion 
addresses. “
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argued  convincingly  elsewhere  that  the  use  of  domain 
names  for  web  navigation  has  converged  with  keyword 
usage,  so that  there is  no compelling  case for  regulating 
them differently from other keywords, such as those used in 
search engines.58
For  legal  accountability,  government-certified  name 
mappers  tied  to  particular  jurisdictions  could  provide  the 
users of sites with legal guarantees within that jurisdiction. 
A site or business could choose to register its service with 
the mapping agency and agree to be bound by the laws of 
that jurisdiction.
 D.Domain names cause many problems which would be 
avoided if names were deregulated
One of the main problems with the DNS as it currently 
exists is that it  provides a very false sense of security to 
name  owners  and  users  alike.  Users  are  likely  to  feel 
reassurance about the identity of an address when they see 
a familiar domain name on their screen.  But this can often 
be illusory.  
In  fact,  a  slew  of  problems  beset  the  domain  name 
system,59 most  of  which  are  deeply  rooted  in  human 
psychology:
cybersquatting – holding a name for ransom (greed)
unwanted expiration/transfer (memory limitations and 
poor organization)
DNS  attacks  –  attacks  on  a  domain  name  server 
58GOLDMAN 2005 supra note 48 at 542-548.
59For more detail on the problems discussed below, see Steve DelBianco 
and Braden Cox, ICANN Internet Governance: Is It Working? (Working 
paper, 2007), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/centers/global/ICANN%20Internet
%20Governance%20-%20Is%20It%20Working.pdf (last visited March 2, 
2008); Eric Goldman, Keyword Regulation and Domain Name 
Exceptionalism, presentation at: I Think I Can, I Think ICANN: Regulating 
the Internet...Or Not (Symposium, University of the Pacific McGeorge 
School of Law, February 24, 2007), slides available at 
http://www.ericgoldman.org/Speeches/domainnameregulation.pdf (last 
visited March 15, 2008).  Some of the problems listed here have 
analogues in the IP address system: for example, IP spoofing, which can 
be used in denial of service attacks.  However, IP address forgery relies 
on a technical problem with TCP/IP that is corrected in IPv6 (see 
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1674, last visited April 17, 2008). 
While IP address problems are generally amenable to technical fixes, 
domain name problems are more often inherent in human psychology 
and thus not so amenable. 
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(malice)
address bar spoofing/redirection and phishing – fooling 
users  into  revealing  private  data  (greed,  cognitive 
limitations, acquiescence)
typosquatting  –  registering  names  similar  to  a 
common name (motor limitations)
domaining  –  accumulating  names  for  sale  (motor 
limitations)
user confusion (memory limitations)
sharking/domain  name  tasting  –  abusing  the  5-day 
grace period for purchasing a newly registered name 
by parking ads  there (greed)
slamming – tricking a name holder into changing to a 
new registrar (greed, cognitive limitations)
expiration  extortion  –  charging  high  rates  to  let 
holders keep domains that have expired (greed, loss 
aversion)
mousetrapping60 – disabling the browser, e.g. when a 
user mistypes an address or enters an expired domain 
name and lands on the mousetrapper's  site instead 
(cognitive limitations, greed)
The  response  to  these  problems  in  the  U.S.,  which 
controls domain names through its contract with ICANN, has 
been a proliferation of regulations specific to domain names. 
The  increasing  number  and  scope  of  these  regulations 
contrasts  with  those  for  the  keywords  used  in  search 
engines.61  Indeed,  the  problems   identified  supra are 
60GOLDMAN 2005 supra note 48 at 544-545.
61GOLDMAN 2007 supra note 59 has listed a number of domain name-
specific regulations in the U.S. as of February 2007. His list includes the 
following. 
 Federal Laws: [1] the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act, implementing trademark protection (15 USC § 1125(d)(1)), in 
rem jurisdiction (15 USC § 1125(d)(2)), personal name protection 
(15 USC § 1129), and domain name registrar/registry 
immunization (15 USC § 1114(2)(D); [2] the Fraudulent Online 
Identity Sanctions Act, increasing IP remedies (15 USC § 1117(e); 
17 USC § 504(c)(3); 18 USC § 3559); [3] the Truth in Domain 
Names Act (18 USC § 2252B) related to misleading domain 
names leading to obscenity/pornography; and [4] the Dot Kids 
Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002.  
 State Laws: [1] State anti-cybersquatting laws (CA B&P Code 
§17525-28; Hawaii 481B-21 to 25; Louisiana LSA-R.S. 51:300.11-
22); [2] State anti-political cyberfraud laws (CA Elec. Code 
§18320-23); and [3] anti-spam/anti-phishing laws.  
 Administrative regulations: [1] Ex ante: allocation controlled by 
centralized bodies with complex governance structures; [2] Ex 
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inherent in our psychology and  domain name system as it 
currently operates.   The toll  of these problems is hard to 
calculate, but one wonders how much the supposed benefits 
of the domain name system are worth, even for those who 
own the most valuable names.  
In evaluating the costs and benefits of the domain name 
system,  it  is  worth  recalling  the  psychological  effects 
mentioned in II.A.  supra.  We tend to be biased toward the 
status quo, even when the benefits of change outweigh the 
costs. We tend to assimilate new evidence in a way that is 
biased  toward  prior  understandings.   Those  who  benefit 
from an existing system tend to  feel  it  is  just,  and even 
those who are disadvantaged by the system are biased in 
favor of justifying it. Debiasing this area of the law implies 
evaluating the costs and benefits of changing the domain 
name system in a way that  consciously  adjusts  for these 
biases, by making an extra effort to look at the benefits of 
change and the costs of the status quo.
 E.  ICANN poses dangers of oligarchy in the control of 
information
An  additional  behavioral  tendency  noted  in  II.A.  supra 
was the iron law of oligarchy.  Many others have critiqued 
the structural evolution of ICANN, and I will not attempt to 
summarize  the  history  and  arguments  here.62  For 
completeness  in  applying  the  empirical  lessons  of 
behavioral  science  to  questions  about  domain  name 
regulation, however, I must note the troubling tendencies in 
ICANN  since  it  dispensed  with  the  attempt  to  represent 
Internet users democratically in 2002, and how those fit with 
Michels' law.63   Oligarchic structures are favored especially 
when they lack accountability to an external public.  This is 
post: ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), supra 
note 54. 
By contrast, Goldman notes that there are relatively few laws regulating 
keywords. State laws on his list include: Utah 13-40-102 to 302; and 
Alaska 45.45.792 to 798.  Private search engines have, on the other 
hand, instituted trademark policies: Yahoo and MSN allow trademark 
owners to block competitive keyword buys; and  Google (US) allows 
trademark owners to block trademark references in advertising copy.
62See Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and 
the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
REV. 65, 94-108 (2005). 
63Id. at 102-104.
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arguably the case with ICANN, since its public accountability 
runs  through  a  thread  of  control  not  with  Internet  users 
generally but with the U.S. Government, and there is in fact 
no international body that could be said to represent the 
people of the world democratically.
Meanwhile, another feature of ICANN – its growing power 
and resources – makes it a target for capture by the vested 
interests  who  disproportionately  control  resources  on  the 
Internet and elsewhere.  The ICANN board is an elite group, 
and appears structured to be so, but the interests in its orbit 
are  also  very  powerful.64  These  and  many  other 
observations one could make about ICANN call into question 
whether  the supposed benefits  of  the  DNS in  its  present 
form,  which  probably  does  require  some  organization  to 
regulate it, are worth the potential price in oligarchic control, 
given what I have argued supra is the lack of necessity for 
this system.
 F. Internet law is an opportunity to evolve concepts more 
appropriately
In  II.B.  supra,  I  argued  for  a  different  system of  legal 
concept evolution, especially for technology policy, namely: 
incremental synthesis.  Domain name law appears to have 
evolved  by  extending  preexisting  concepts:  trademarks, 
frequency licenses, and property. But of course the bodies of 
law  around  all  of  these  concepts  developed  for  a  set  of 
cases  that  did  not  include  domain  names,  and  domain 
names possess novel aspects with respect to all of them.  
Names used for Internet navigation are a novel concept, 
somewhat  akin to ordinary names such as those held by 
organizations and individuals.  In most cases, the law does 
not grant exclusive rights to names.  The case for doing so 
rests on the idea that overall welfare is improved by having 
a  unique mapping between names and IP  addresses that 
holds everywhere and for everyone (though importantly not 
forever). But as I have argued, the requirements of such a 
system result in very serious costs, and the system seems 
more  likely  to  be  perpetuating  itself  because  of  the 
psychological tendencies I have argued characterize the law 
generally.
64Id.
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It is possible that the domain name system will  wither 
away,  if  browsers  and  their  users  evolve  practices  that 
ignore official domain names in favor of more locally useful 
ways to resolve words into addresses. On the other hand, 
there  is  substantial  momentum behind  the  domain  name 
system.  But merely understanding the alternatives might 
be enough to push the system and its infrastructure out of 
existence, for example if private and government interests 
realize that they can build tools in a way that deemphasizes 
domain names per se. 
 V.CONCLUSION
The analysis I have presented makes an argument for the 
deregulation  of  domain  names  on  the  grounds  that  the 
domain name system is unnecessary at a global level, that it 
causes serious problems for users and site providers, and 
that  it  creates  a  class  of  rights  holders  who  constitute 
vested  interests  and  might  stand  in  the  way  of  better 
Internet architectures.   At this point, ICANN and the DNS are 
well  enough  established  that  they  may  be  difficult  in 
practice to abolish.  If so, then the creation of domain names 
and  eventually  of  ICANN should  serve  as  an  example  of 
what  to  avoid:  a  regime that  is  unnecessary,  costly,  and 
cumbersome to reform. 
Meanwhile, I find this corner of technology policy to be a 
useful  place  to  apply  deeper  thinking  about  psychology, 
technology,  and  law.   Behavioral  biases  have  the  most 
potential  to  do  damage  in  when  we  have  the  least 
experience to counteract them.  New technologies represent 
realms  where  everyone,  including  lawmakers,  lacks 
experience. So it seems reasonable to pay special attention 
to  behavioral  biases  when thinking about  the  law around 
new technologies.
